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Preface 
 
This Working Paper for the Department of Intercultural Communications and Management (IKL) 
of Copenhagen Business School is being filed to record a path that combines educational concerns 
related to the European Undergraduate – Research Oriented Participatory Educational model of 
Copenhagen Business School with comparative industrial relations research stream concerned with 
labor law and contemporary enterprise ecology studies of employee participation in management 
prerogative.  
 
As with the other Working Paper I am filing this year, I wish to note, with gratitude, the 
involvement of Maribel Blasco as one of the Department’s “Educational Irregulars”. She 
generously offered her time as an internal reader for this paper.  
 
The paper was first composed in the fall of 2007. It was submitted to, and accepted at, the 
Management Education Division, for the 2008 Academy of Management Conference. Maribel 
attended the internal Asian Research Seminar presentation of this paper on 7 February 2008 as the 
IKL reader for later Working Paper submission. Her observations and suggestions were extremely 
helpful in planning for revisions of this paper for possible publication. 
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Abstract 
 
The modern enterprise is everywhere recognized as an independent, enduring, legal person or entity. 
Yet, management education fails in fundamental aspects of its mission if the internal authority, 
information and resource prerogatives in the firm are presented as univocal - everywhere the same. 
A comparative legal ecology model, derived from industrial relations and taught in a Scandinavian 
business school, is introduced as a pedagogic tool to manifest these parameters, which structure the 
firm and come from a firm’s national origins. Model parameters include employment security, labor 
unions and the degree of employee participation permitting (if any); a schematic is offered for the 
United States of America, Germany, Japan, Denmark, and the People’s Republic of China - this last 
on a provisional basis. The models can account for the legal extent and nature of managerial 
prerogative, job security, and degree of information and resource transparency of any enterprise. 
The legal ecology of an enterprise can facilitate analysis of external firm behavior and performance 
domestically, in other national markets, or the international business environment. Understanding 
these legal ecology models serves as a complement and aid to study of the modern enterprise in 
reference to distinctions between national political economies. The employee participation 
parameter offers theoretical grounds for hypothesis testing of enterprise differences in orientation to 
short-term profits, emphasis on market share and other corporate strategies. The models appear to 
account for variance in the equitable distribution of enterprise gains – particularly the high 
executive compensation levels that persist almost exclusively in U.S. enterprises. 
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“Where would you like to work and why?” 
Legal ecology enterprise models for comparative study 
 
 As educators in the related fields of management, economics, development, or corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), there are certain questions we should be able to ask about the nature of 
the modern enterprise. Of course, as instructors, we should also be able to help students gain 
understanding and insight into possible answers to these questions, which include:  
- “What is an American (or other national) firm?”  
- “How does this firm differ from a Japanese firm?”  
- “Why do firms with different national origins function differently in different national 
settings no less than in transnational settings?”  
And, of course, we should be able to help students to ask and frame possible answers to the most 
important employment question they will soon face as graduates: “What type of firm do you wish to 
work for – and why?” 
 Originally developed in the course of field work concerned with the existence and nature of 
Japan’s lifetime employment system, the comparative legal ecology model of the modern enterprise 
has been used in coursework at a Scandinavian business school, particularly its Asian Studies 
Program, to schematically depict critically important corporate parameters that define internal 
authority, information flow and resource prerogatives in the modern firm – and these in reference to 
the firm’s national industrial relations system of origin. As we shall see below, the parameters 
derive from explication of the “web of rules” governing employment relations in each national 
system, which is the object of study in the field of industrial relations (Dunlop, J. 1958;Kaufman, B. 
E. 2004).  
 The legal ecology schema sheds light on the internal legal make-up of a firm – its internal 
legal ecology or genetic structure. These parameters condition and influence firm behavior, to 
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differing degrees, both domestically as well as when a firm decides to move beyond its national 
borders. They should even impact enterprise function and performance in the international, 
transnational, and meta-national business environments (Doz, Y., Santos, J., & Williamson, P. 2001) 
Thus, the comparative legal ecology model of analysis can serve as a firm-specific tool that aids 
understanding of the modern firm in a manner consistent with and complementary to path 
dependent analyses of comparative political economies. 
 We begin with an explanation of the “web of rules (or ‘working rules’)” of employment 
relations.” The “web of rules” is the object of interest – the dependent variable - in the field of 
industrial relations. We review aspects of this academic discipline essential for understanding the 
notion of firm-specific comparative legal ecology models. This section includes the rationale for 
our theoretical re-orienting of industrial relations – expressing the “web of rules” in terms of an 
ecological schematic that comparatively depicts distributions of authority, information access and 
flow, and resource access and control on a firm-specific basis. The rest of the paper proceeds as 
follows:  
- Second, we will introduce the legal ecology model of the U.S. firm, because this is, in an 
important sense, chronologically and causally antecedent to the Japan case. It is also the 
easiest to understand.  
- Third, we discuss the nature and function of Co-determination (die Mitbestimmung) and 
Works Councils (der Betriebsrat) as these are institutionalized in the German national 
industrial relations system and how they have been adapted in other national settings. 
This permits consideration of the legal ecology schema of the modern German enterprise.  
- Fourth, we explore the working rules of the Japanese industrial relations system, 
focusing on the contributions made by the father of Japanese labor law: Suehiro Izutaro 
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(末弘巌太郎)1. This exploration allows explication of the legal ecology of the Japanese 
firm, which – we can and should note at the outset – is essentially based upon labor 
legislation that closely follows that of the American model. However, the ecology of the 
Japanese firm differs substantially its U.S. counterpart, because Japanese labor 
legislation was markedly transformed by legal interpretations, in case law and Central 
Labor Relations Commission recommendations, both firmly grounded in continental 
European approaches to labor law and practice.  
- Fifth, having come to understand these three comparative models of the modern 
enterprise, we examine a small state model in the European Union – Denmark – and 
then move to a speculative discussion of the emerging legal ecology model of the 
Chinese firm.  
- The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of comparative legal ecology 
models. An important consideration will be the comparative use of these models to 
benchmark industrial democracy, and how the evidence clearly suggests progress in this 
democratic value does not come at the expense of industrial competitiveness. We will 
show how the Japan case exemplifies adaptive appropriation and consider the 
importance of functional equivalence in efforts to transform management practice from 
one ecological model to another. We will also suggest that the comparative legal 
ecology of the contemporary enterprise might serve as a benchmark for comparative 
industrial democracy measures and how these might relate to indicators of competitive 
success as the “civilizing process” of globalization continues. 
  As a contribution to the Management Education Division of the Academy of Management, 
this paper reports the use of comparative legal ecology models of the modern enterprise in 
                                                     
1 Japanese names are given according to Japanese custom: surname followed by given name.  
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undergraduate level instruction. It was first taught in methods and content courses in an Asian 
Studies Program at a Scandinavian business school. More recently, these enterprise models have 
been used in a senior level undergraduate elective course titled, “Organizing International Business 
(OIB)”. To remain firmly grounded in practical teaching plans and outcomes, the OIB learning 
objectives and course plan are presented in Appendix 1 and will be referred to when appropriate.2  
2. Industrial Relations Method: Deriving the Legal Ecology Model of a Modern Enterprise 
 
  Industrial relations as a field of study holds the “web of rules governing employment 
relations” as its object of interest; in terms of research method, this “web of rules” is the dependent 
variable to be explained. These rules vary by nation, yielding national industrial relations systems. 
“Working rules” can also be analyzed at any number of other levels: industrial sector, region, even 
the shop floor or classroom.3 Essentially, the web of rules comes into existence once the three 
primary actors in any industrial relations system find mutual assent to fundamental norms, allowing 
industrial chaos to yield to civil order. This is a first, basic, and essential step in what has been 
described as the “civilizing process” (Kristensen, P. H. 2005).  
 The three primary actors are employers (and their representatives), employees (and their 
representatives), and government (in its variety of representative functions). As a field, industrial 
relations arose from dissatisfaction with economics as a reliable and valid method. Thus, the field 
of industrial relations was, from the outset, interdisciplinary in scope. It draws upon an informed 
critique of economics, considered theoretically insufficient to adequately account for observed 
market functions and performance, as well as history, politics, sociology, studies of political 
economy, also law (the regulation of consent and power in society). Historically, industrial relations 
                                                     
2 This is the elective course title. Many references in this paper are also found in the “Organizing International Business” 
course plan (Appendix 1). The education institution and instructors have been rendered anonymous. 
3 When the “web of rules” is first introduced in class, a discussion of how such an analysis might apply to the classroom 
circumstance is as entertaining as it is useful. Who is the employer and who is the employee in a university classroom 
consisting of students and instructor? How is authority, information, and other variables mediated in such a setting? 
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research method has tended to favor ‘mid-level’ studies: field work involving cases, sectors, and 
organized labor issues. Too, there is a fundamental assumption that the elaboration of these working 
rules follows the expansion of markets.  
 Study of international business makes abundantly clear that product and labor markets have 
now expanded to a global, international scale. Despite obvious processes of internationalization and 
globalization, political economists find renewed significance in the study of distinctions in political 
economies at the national level (Morgan, G., Whitely, R., & Moen, E. 2006). Whitley wrote that 
nation-states vary by type and this variance is associated with business systems and firm 
characteristics (Whitely, R. 2005b). He identified four ‘ideal’ state types, possible national 
examples of each are given in parentheses:  
- Arm’s length (U.S.A.) 
- Dominant developmental (Singapore) 
- Business Corporatist (Japan) 
- Inclusive Corporatist (Germany) 
Within each ideal type, Whitley also offered characterizations of employment relations along the 
following parameters (p. 205):  
Associated business system and 
firm characteristics / 
Employment relations 
Arm’s length Dominant 
developmental 
Business corporatist Inclusive 
corporatist 
Authority sharing with skilled 
staff 
Varies between 
sectors and 
firm types 
Generally limited Some in larger firms Considerable in 
most firms 
Long-term employer/employee 
commitments 
Low Some for managerial 
staff, limited 
otherwise 
Considerable in 
larger firms, limited 
elsewhere 
Considerable in 
most firms 
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 Whitley notes that the nations approximating each of these ideal types may change over 
time. The Republic of Korea, for example, appears to have shifted from a dominant developmental 
model to something approaching a business corporatist state. In contrast, Germany and France may 
be shifting from inclusive corporatism to the more business corporatist type. However, recent news 
suggests such even fundamental presumptions about profit and wealth remain a much contested 
domain. French President Nicolas Sarkozy recently proposed a radical change corporate profit 
distributions in France. He said, "A system in which a third of the profits of a company would be 
for shareholders, a third for employees and a third for investment is a system ...that would have a 
certain coherence and logic" ( 2008) 
 Theorizing in respect to ideal types at the level of comparative political economies is an 
essential task in our contemporary world. It is also a task that leaves industrial relations specialists 
ever so slightly uneasy: ‘ideal types’ are never concrete instances – they succeed in eluding capture 
and measurement by social science methodology. More important, perhaps, is the lack of 
explanatory power according to state type for the comparative attributions made to firm specific 
differences: authority sharing and long-term employer/employee commitment. What causes these 
different relationships to come about? Are the long term employment commitments due to 
managerial altruism? Are they firm intrinsic or are there compelling externalities? 
 Thus, even with distinctive national systems of political economy, we remain outside the 
“black box” of that which constitutes the modern enterprise. While trans-national corporations have 
emerged and may yet be identified as being an “American” or ”German” firm, there is scant basis to 
explain what such distinctions mean, aside from historical attribution or the firm’s headquarters 
office address. Corporations are legal entities, endowed with the same rights that would be 
attributed to persons. Unlike individuals, corporations appear to have no specific, predictable 
demise. Instead, the modern enterprise persists insofar as profit permits. Given stable and enduring 
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assent from each of the three partners in a national industrial relations system, a certain degree of 
stasis can be expected. Dunlop’s 1958 systemization of the field, Industrial Relations Systems, 
reflects the time period.  
 Yet, by the 1980s, a transformation in American industrial relations changed the postwar 
status quo, resulting in an expansion of managerial prerogative (Kochan, T. A., Katz, H. C., & 
McKersie, R. B. 1984;Kochan, T. A., Katz, H. C., & McKersie, R. B. 1986). The emphasis on 
“strategic choice” recast the nature of the American enterprise both domestically and in reference to 
U.S. enterprise strategies abroad. Ironically, one of the factors cited that prompted this change in 
U.S. managerial prerogative, leading management to work “outside” the postwar norms of the 
American system’s accepted web of rules, was the strong impact of Japanese management success 
in value added exports – the “hollowing out” of U.S. manufacturing infrastructure. Due to these 
developments, the interplay of power and information within the legal entity of a given American 
firm invites an ecological analysis.4 And, as the specified parameters reside in labor law, this model 
is not an “ideal type”. Corporations (referred to as ‘enterprises’ in this paper) are recognized in law 
as legal entities; they are persons without physical being in the biological sense. Yet, like any 
nominal entity, they take in resources, transform matter, produce goods and waste, and seek to 
endure over time. Firms occupy a niche; the study of the birth, persistence, and failure of firms 
within a specific niche is an academic field that is known as organizational ecology (Hannan, M. T. 
& Freeman, J. H. 1989). 
 The term “legal ecology” appears in the title of a 2005 research paper dedicated to the study 
of ecosystem functions and the law (Rohlf, Daniel J., Dobkin, David S. October 2005). Our current 
interest in the phrase – the legal ecology of the modern enterprise – concerns the internal dynamics 
                                                     
4 To be clear, it was the Japan case that first prompted the legal ecology schematization. Yet, the ‘strategic choice’ 
literature was known to the primary author. Along with the analysis of the Japanese ‘web of rules’ at the firm level, the 
dynamic changes in the U.S. system was suggestive of the need for a schematic depiction of comparative managerial 
prerogative and its institutional constraints. 
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– or ‘balancing’ - of the employer <> employee relationship within an individual firm as these are 
conditioned by external legal norms. The internal dynamics can be specified in respect to 
employment rules governing authority/power, information, and control of resources. As we shall 
see, the U.S. model is relatively simple and straightforward. 
  
2.a The legal ecology of the American enterprise 
 
The U.S. legal ecology model is offered first because it is the easiest to comprehend. Since the New 
Deal labor legislation of the Roosevelt administration and – significantly – the legal interpretations 
of the National Labor Relations Commission, workers may unionize. Unions may negotiate over 
wages and working conditions. The nature of the U.S. employment contract is “at will”: employer 
and employee are presumed equal parties to contract. Functionally, employment ‘at will’ permits 
the U.S. employer to dismiss for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. 
 Having noted this managerial prerogative, it is important to note (and this is always stressed 
and discussed in class) that U.S. federal law prohibits discriminatory employment practices in 
respect to religion, race, political party affiliation, sex, and, most recently, age. In addition, state 
legislation may further restrict ‘at will’ managerial prerogatives. Collective bargaining agreements 
additionally constrain U.S. managerial prerogative; these are negotiated between legally recognized 
employee representatives and employer representatives and reflect negotiated determinations about 
wages and working conditions.  
 The legal ecology of the U.S. firm is given in Figure 1. The solid black lines between 
management and employees depict the assumed conflicting nature of the underlying employment 
relationship between employer and (organized) employees. Apart from issues of wages and 
working conditions, there are no formal, institutionalized mechanisms to negotiate or discuss 
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matters regarding authority, power, or detailed information and/or policy regarding the enterprise. 
Insofar as employees are granted additional rights or discretionary powers - stock options or other 
forms of “employee empowerment” - these are strictly at the discretion of the employer: hence, the 
downward arrow to the right.5  
 It is important to note that the schematic does not intend to negate the prevalence or role of 
work teams in U.S. employment settings. As we shall see, these simply lack the institutionalized 
stature recognized in employee representative groups in other national settings.6 
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
 
3. The Legal Ecology of the German Enterprise: Just Cause, Legislated Co-determination and 
Works Councils 
 
 The legal ecology of the German enterprise follows the U.S. model in respect to labor union 
negotiation rights about wages and working conditions, even as to the presumption of fundamental 
conflict in respect to the aims of both parties. In one domain of contrast, employment contracts in 
Germany can only be abrogated given just cause. It is not legal for an employer to dismiss an 
employee for no reason or a bad reason. In another contrast, as Figure 2 makes clear, the German 
model (and, we note, the European Union works council model since 1994) obliges, by legislation, 
works councils in firms beyond a certain size. Works councils can be defined as, “institutionalized 
bodies for representative communication between a single employer (management) and the 
                                                     
5 Readers familiar with the U.S. model may experience frustration at ’pointing out the obvious’. It will become apparent 
in the next sections how the legal ecology of a firm in different national settings can profoundly transform the internal 
dynamics of modern enterprise.   
6 Work groups and/or teams established by employer prerogative, by lacking extrinsic institutional support, do not 
possess adequate grounds to address issues such as executive compensation.  
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employees (workforce) of a single plant or enterprise” (Rogers, J. & Streeck, W. 1995)  In addition, 
at the top level of a firm’s governing board, proportional representation by elected representatives 
of employees is also obligatory by legislation. Taken together, Works Council and Board 
membership participation in the life of a German enterprise are referred to as “Co-determination” 
(die Mitbestimmung). The German Co-determination schematic of Figure 2 depicts a degree of 
transparency and participation in authority, information and resource control by the dotted lines that 
separate management and the Works Council, in contrast to the solid lines separating the union and 
management functions. 
 
 
Figure 2 about here. 
 
 
 Co-determination in Germany has a history that has been traced to the 1848 Frankfurt 
National Assembly (Jackson, G. 2001). It is due to this particular history that Germany is the 
present focus of our current comparative analysis; the Japanese postwar legal ecology development 
is, as we shall soon see, based on the German case.  
 Before we look in more detail at the works council feature of co-determination, we should 
note that the European Union has adopted participation as an integral policy. In 2005, the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) reported the following on its website:  
The claim that co-determination is an alien concept in Europe does not stand up to 
scrutiny…. Even though the German arrangements regarding worker participation are more 
extensive than in other European countries, Hoffmann points out that this is far from 
equivalent to saying that other European countries have widespread co-determination-free 
areas. In fact 18 of the 25 EU Member States have binding rules governing co-determination, 
and in many cases their arrangements provide for an extensive workforce presence on 
companies’ supervisory boards. In the new Member States company bodies are taking their 
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lead from German law, and in Slovenia - by law - companies employing more than 1,000 
staff have to guarantee the workforce 50% participation (ETUC 8 A.D.).7 
 
 This development both recalls, and strengthens, an observation by Wolfgang Streeck in a 
1995 text. He wrote of the “largely forgotten” process of “the almost universal establishment of 
works councils after 1945 in otherwise very different national contexts, as a integral part of a 
worldwide recasting of the political economy of capitalism” (Streeck, W. 1995)p. 313). 
It will be useful to elaborate on the possible range and role of works councils, precisely 
because of their varied manifestations in different national settings. Works councils, briefly: 
1. “represent all the workers at a given workplace, irrespective of their status as 
union members”, 
2. “represent the workforce of a specific plant or enterprise, not an industrial sector 
or a territorial area”, 
3. “are not ‘company unions’”, 
4. being representative institutions, “differ from management policies encouraging 
individual workers to express their views and ideas, as well as new forms of work 
organization introduced to increase the “involvement” of workers”,  
5. enable “representative communication between employers and their workforces,” 
which “may be of all possible kinds and may originate from either side”,  
6. “may (the usual case) or may not have legal status”, 
7. “structures vary widely across and within countries”, and 
8. “are not the same as worker representation on company boards of directors” 
(Rogers, J. et al. 1995), pp. 6-9).  
                                                     
7 “Hoffmann” is Deputy General Secretary Reiner Hoffmann, speaking at an IG Metall conference on worker 
pariticpation held in Dortmund on 17 November 2004.  
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Rogers and Streeck specified three “ideal types” of works councils. First, paternalistic 
councils are those formed by employers or government. These permit worker representation only to 
the extent that the independent expression of worker interest is constrained, by prior intent. In this 
respect, there is a political dimension to their establishment. Second, consultative councils are 
primarily for economic purposes, unlike the politically constrained end envisioned with the 
paternalist type. Consultative councils are mainly for communications between management and 
workers to enhance firm competitiveness and, possibly, implement rewards systems. These councils 
supplement the firm’s functional organization.  And, third, representative councils “are typically 
established through collective agreements or legislation giving the entire workforce of a plant or 
enterprise (again, unionized or not) some form of institutionalized voice in relation to management” 
(p. 10).  In contrast to consultative councils, representative councils are “part of a firm’s political 
system” (p. 11). 
 Given the background on the U.S. enterprise legal ecology, and informed of the nature and 
function of co-determination and works councils in the German enterprise, we are now ready to turn 
our attention to the Japan case. It was in Japan, shortly after the end of World War II, that works 
councils were adapted from their German origins to resolve a political crisis within a devastated 
Asian nation.    
4. The Legal Ecology of the Japanese Enterprise: Suehiro Jurisprudence – “Just Cause” 
through Case Law and Management Councils in Collective Bargaining Agreements 
 
 The initial design notion for the comparative legal ecologies of Japanese, U.S., and German 
firms first arose from a study of the institutionalized practice of lifetime employment in Japan 
(Tackney, C. T. 1995). Izutaro Suehiro, a legal and labor law specialist, was instrumental in the 
establishment of three postwar industrial relations practices: study and systemization of the role of 
case law as a pattern and norm generating legal resource – beginning long before World War II, the 
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subsequent ‘just cause’ case law restrictions on managerial dismissal prerogative – initially 
appearing, ironically, in dismissal efforts by Occupation forces against redundant Japanese 
employees, and the localization of employee participation prerogative (modeled on German works 
councils) within the postwar Japanese collective bargaining agreement.  
 Suehiro’s various contributions to Japanese legal studies are recognized – it is known as 
“Suehiro jurisprudence” (末弘法学). This phrase is well-known to many Japanese legal scholars, if 
the precise content of the term remains rather amorphous and difficult to signify. For present 
purposes, it is only necessary to keep in mind that Suehiro’s contributions to Japanese labor law, 
reviewed above, stand upon distinct, and distinctively Continental European, interpretations of 
labor law legislation. Again, it is with considerable irony that the Japanese postwar labor laws were 
essentially identical to the New Deal legislation of the United States of America. 
 Following legal interpretations extant in continental Europe, Suehiro jurisprudence 
presumes that the labor contract is inherently unequal; the hired worker is comparatively 
disadvantaged in comparison to the hiring employer. Accordingly, corrective measures should be 
taken by the courts, with appropriate norms becoming ‘codified’ through case law outcomes. As a 
means to overcome extremely antagonistic confrontations between Japanese employers and 
unionized workers in the aftermath of World War II, Suehiro was also instrumental in the crafting 
of a July 1946 Central Labor Relations Commission guideline that advocated creation of 
“Management Councils” (経営協議会, Keiei kyogikai). These were explicitly modeled on German 
works councils, but uniquely based in firm-specific collective bargaining agreements.  
 Due to case law decisions enforcing just cause as restriction upon managerial dismissal 
prerogative and the single document issued in July, 1946 by the newly formed Central Labor 
Relations Commission, the Japanese firm’s legal ecology is radically different from that of its U.S. 
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counterpart. The differences in degree of the legal interpretations given essentially similar 
legislation – by the Japanese courts and the Central Labor Relations Commission – resulted in a 
difference in kind concerning the emergent post-war legal ecology of the Japanese firm.8  
 The Japanese legal ecology of the firm is given in Figure 3. Note the similarity to the U.S. 
and German models in regard to the presence of labor unions, their right to negotiate over wages 
and working conditions, and the solid line depicting a fundamental conflict of interest between 
union and management.9 As Japan’s management councils arise from collective bargaining 
agreements, there is an obvious transparency of form and function between the labor union and the 
management council; this is depicted by the dotted line between them. In turn, the relationship 
between the management council and the management staff is also variable – and varied; again, this 
is depicted by a dotted line.  
 
 
Figure 3 about here. 
 
 
 While German law and European Union directives tend to specify a minimum number of 
employees in a firm before works council representative functions are mandated, the Japanese have 
no such restriction. Data from a 1999 survey indicate that 41.1% of all Japanese firms surveyed 
have some form of management council, while 58.2% do not. Yet, 84.8% of unionized firms report 
                                                     
8 For a  thorough examination of Suehiro’s adaptive appropriation of Weimar era German jurisprudence, see (Kettler, D. 
& Tackney, C. T. 1997). 
9 For the most part, Japanese labor unions are organized on an enterprise basis. Neither craft nor industrial unions 
predominate in Japan. Thus, Toyota (automobiles) and Okuma (machine tools), both firms located in Aichi Prefecture, 
have distinct and separate labor unions. In practice, as the legal ecology model we are describing makes clear, firm-
specific information flows concerning wages and working conditions between and among Japanese labor unions in 
respect to type, regional affiliation, and national federation, are extremely high. The long-term employment 
arrangements ensure that proprietary information remains within a specific firm.  
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management councils; and 77.9% of firms having 5,000 or more employees report the presence of 
such councils (Ministry of Labor Policy Secretariat Survey Section 1999). 
  
5. The Legal Ecology of Danish and Chinese Enterprises 
 
 We can now look at two other national cases in our study of comparative legal ecologies of 
the modern enterprise: Denmark and the People’s Republic of China. Both nations, for very 
different reasons, show recent transformation in the formal arrangements of the legal ecologies in 
each nation’s corporate enterprises. For Denmark, it will be valuable to see how this nation’s 
historical enterprise ecology – in respect to the parameters of employment security, managerial 
prerogative, and employee participation – is undergoing change due to EU membership. The PRC 
enterprise, in turn, will be of interest due to the emerging norms of this nation – especially in light 
of its communist legacy. 
 First, we will consider Denmark. As in the Japan and German cases, Danish employment 
that continues beyond a specified time, or after completion of a specified task, “most often means 
that the contract of employment has changed into a normal contract of employment concluded for 
an indefinite period of time…” (Hasselbalch, O. 2005). The dismissal decision prerogative, on the 
grounds of right to manage, resides with the Danish employer. However, this right “has been 
limited to no small degree during the last decades by statues and not least by collective agreements 
which prescribe that a dismissal should be for a fair reason (Ibid., p. 162).  
 Denmark has a history of establishing of cooperative committees between employer and 
organized employees dating from 1936 (Ibid.). The most recently revised agreement was concluded 
in 1986, between peak employer and employee representative organizations – and the form of the 
cooperative committees that exist are similar for both public and private sectors.  
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 In contrast, Denmark labor law does not have a works councils system. EU membership 
obliges Danish participation in EU directives, including the 22 May 1996 implementation of the EC 
Directive on European Works Councils. The Directive addresses “Community-scale” undertakings, 
which require that the undertaking: 
1. “employs at least 1,000 employees in EU member states and EEA countries (excluding 
the United Kingdom); and 
2. has establishments in at least two of the countries referred to in (1); and  
3. employs at least 150 employees in each of at (l)east two of the countries referred to in 
(1)” (Ibid., p. 225).  
 Thus, on the one hand, the European Works Councils Directive, “marks a break in the UK 
and Denmark, from the national traditions of modelling the relations between employers and 
employee representatives solely on the basis of agreements concluded with trade unions (Knudsen 
and Bruun 1998:135)” (Stoop, S. 2004).  On the other hand, the EU norms do not apply “where a 
collective agreement or other agreements contains obligations and rights which at least match the 
provisions of Directive 94/45” (Ibid. 224). Thus, the Danish enterprise legal ecology can be 
depicted as shown in Figure 4. In the Danish case, a change to EU works councils would mean  – in 
practice – that committees formerly composed of both management and employee representatives 
would have to be reconstituted as strictly employee representative bodies; this is a shift from 
agreement-based policy to that of formal law. By 1998, there were six multinationals that had 
established European Works Councils in Denmark (Pedersini, R. 1998). Data from the European 
Trade Union Institute for Research, Health, and Education and Safety Research Department 
indicates that as of January 15, 2008, Denmark has 63 companies headquartered in Denmark and 
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covered by the EWC Directive. Of these, 26 have already established an EU works councils, while 
37 have not. The compliance rate to date is, then, 41%. 10 
 
 
Figure 4 about here. 
 
 
 The People’s Republic of China offers yet another interesting case for study of a firm-
specific legal ecology that derives from a national political economy. In the instance, Chinese firms 
exist in an increasingly profit-driven market, while laden with a Chinese Communist centralized 
production legacy in a political environment where the Chinese Communist Party retains hegemony.  
 After decades of communist rule and directed reforms of state-owned enterprises, which 
resulted in massive loss of jobs, there have recently been substantial reforms in Chinese corporate 
governance and labor laws. The China Company Law was revised in 1993, and again in October 
2005. This last reform came into effect on January 1, 2006. A new labor law came into force quite 
recently - January 1, 2008.  
 In general, there is sufficient evidence to identify the parameters of the legal ecology of the 
Chinese enterprise – insofar as these laws indicate suggested norms. Tam, in 1999, wrote that 
China’s Company Law “has made provisions…for employee participation in the corporate 
governance of SOEs through representation on the supervisory board… this formalized 
participation reflects a line of thinking among Chinese policy makers that suggests some acceptance 
and recognition of the role of employees in the development of corporate governance” (Tam, O. K. 
1999). The 2006 reform continued the role of Supervisory Board for solely state-owned enterprises, 
                                                     
10 The author would like to thank Romuald Jogodzinki of the ETUI-REHS for very timely provision of this data. See 
the website: www.teui-rehs.org/research for additional information.  
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with the board needing one-third employee representation. More recent evidence indicates that the 
new Chinese labor law obliges cause for termination of contract, thus the PRC has taken a path on 
dismissals similar to that of Europe.11  Accordingly, the legal ecology of the PRC firm is 
provisionally given in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5 about here. 
 
 
Discussion  
 The comparative models of the legal ecology of the modern enterprise were initially 
developed to depict, in a simple schematic, the salient differences in labor law that substantially 
condition the character of Japanese, U.S., and German modern enterprises. This step was taken to 
account for the development of the lifetime employment system in Japan – and to do so in a manner 
that facilitates comparison and contrast according to standard social science method (Tackney, C. T. 
2000;Tackney, C. T. 2001).  
 The author has reported on the use of these research findings to structure an undergraduate 
senior elective course titled, “Organizing International Business.” Functionally, the comparative 
legal ecology enterprise models were introduced to complement a required course text on 
comparative political economy (Morgan, G. et al. 2006). The course was taught at a Scandinavian 
business school. Approximately one-third of the students attending this course were exchange 
students.  
                                                     
11 That is, a bad reason or no reason would not constitute a reasonable cause for contract termination. See the blogsite: 
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2007/11/chinas_new_labor_law_its_a_hug.html . This site contains links to the text of 
the new labor law.  
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 The comparative legal ecology models proved useful as a way to present to students the 
very different dynamics that exist in firms, arising from the legal frameworks found in their nation 
of origin. This suggests it is possible to effectively characterize firms not only according to 
economic theories: suppression of price mechanism or market failures, to mention but two 
approaches (Coase, R. 1937;Williamson, O. 1971).12 The comparative models offer an interesting 
way to explore enterprise differences, based on national origins, and then examine their differing 
behavioral propensities when a firm expands to other national settings as well as in the international 
business environment. For undergraduate students, this appears to be a novel and successful way to 
introduce a range of complex notions important for industrial relations and comparative labor law. 
In classes with a large number of exchange students from various nations, a homework assignment 
with subsequent discussion of students’ national enterprise legal ecology models offers a chance to 
explore national histories, path dependent developments, and future challenges.  
 There are a number of caveats to note in connection with the models proposed. First, these 
models have analytic merit on a general national level; firms that do not follow these norms 
certainly may be found. Put simply, it certainly remains possible for a U.S. firm to function in a 
manner resembling its Japanese and/or German counterparts: avoidance of dismissals, coupled with 
solicitation and reward for high levels of employee participation. Yet, even given such exceptional 
cases, the significance of these models are clear - ‘just cause’ or an employee participation 
approach to employment relations within a given U.S. firm must arise from strong dispositions for 
these practices within the specific management team and these must be sustained over a long period 
of time to be perceived as an enterprise norm.  
 Instead, the legal ecology conditions can be seen as functionally equivalent benchmarks for 
the successful adaptation of Japanese management practices to the U.S. (or potentially other) 
                                                     
12 For further analysis of ‘coodinated capitalism’ at the level of comparative political economy, see (Streeck, W. & 
Yamamura, K. 2001;Yamamura, K. & Streeck, W. 2003). 
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national settings. This is because compelling external obligations upon management simply do not 
exist within the United States industrial relations system.  
 Second, these are analytical models; they do not attempt to capture the unethical or illegal 
behavioral propensities of managers (or employees) in any of the nations or firms studied. Third, 
the German enterprise ecology limits the upward potential of employee participation by carefully 
defined legislation. In contrast, the Japan case, by basing participation issues within collective 
bargaining agreements, shares no similar theoretical restriction on the potential for employee 
participation in the life of the enterprise.  
 Perhaps the most important observation to be made concerns the singularity of the U.S. legal 
ecology model. There was a period in the first Clinton administration when experimentation with 
Works Councils was formally discussed, even encouraged, by the then chair of the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) and, subsequently, in Presidential Commission known as The Dunlop 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (Dunlop Commission 1994;Gould IV, 
W. B. 1984;Gould IV, W. B. 1993).13  The arrival of the Bush administration put an abrupt end to 
any momentum for even small scale experimentation in employee participation with NLRB 
oversight. It is worth noting that this flexible approach is something Japan’s then fledgling Central 
Labor Relations Commission quickly and completely sanctioned in 1946, some five decades earlier.  
 As explicit and comparative indicators of industrial democracy in the workplace, the legal 
ecology models document that the U.S. variant lags far behind both German (now EU) and 
Japanese counterparts. The proxy measures for industrial democracy, to be clear, are ‘just cause’ 
dismissal constraint on managerial prerogative and employee participation opportunities, whether 
legislated Works Councils and Board Co-determination (in the German case), the outcome of 
cooperative agreements between peak employer-employee associations (in Denmark), or the 
                                                     
13 For a critique of the Dunlop Commission Final Report, see (Troy, L. 1995), who nevertheless noted the employee 
participation recommendations constituted the only “forward looking” items in the Report. 
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outcome of collective bargaining agreements (Japan). If equity in profit distribution is also a 
measure of industrial democracy, then it would seem obvious that the extreme levels of executive 
compensation in U.S. firms, compared to executives in the E.U. or Japan (for example), are the 
causal outcome of the absence of employee participation in the information, power, and resource 
distributions in the contemporary U.S. enterprise.  
 Supporting the notion of American exceptionalism, recent research suggests that long-term 
multinational enterprise success in the international business environment may increasingly due to 
the creation and sustenance of “idiosyncratic firm-specific capabilities that result from managers 
and skilled workers contributing to organizational problem-solving  and growth over a considerable 
period of time” (Whitely, R. 2005a). In terms of international competitiveness, the remarkable 
postwar success of both German and Japanese employee participatory models, along with their 
continued competitive strength – particularly in value added manufacturing - makes it difficult to 
sustain claims that future economic and competitive success in the U.S. case necessarily depends 
upon the exceptional degree of managerial prerogative that has persisted to this day. Indeed, any 
assertion that this exceptional level of American managerial prerogative is necessary to ensure U.S. 
competitive prowess in global markets must, instead, now justify such claims. As one example, we 
may consider Japan’s postwar success in the automobile manufacturing sector – Toyota in 
particular - in contrast to the decades-long decline in General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. Each of 
the major Japanese automobile manufacturers has active – sometimes quite contentious - 
management councils participation arrangements that have long operated within the national legal 
framework of ‘just cause’ employee security. 
 As the legal ecology modeling effort began in the context of field work in Japanese 
industrial relations, a few specialized comments may be appropriate before closing. The enterprise 
legal ecology model is a way to characterize the Japanese firm – and Japanese management 
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practices – in a manner empirically grounded in the historical principles of Suehiro jurisprudence. 
As Japanese unions are enterprise-based unions (企業別組合, kigyobetsu kumiai), and as just-
cause norms, along with employee participation, are focused upon the success of a specific 
enterprise, the legal ecology analysis of such an enterprise appears to form an appropriate unit for 
social science research.  
 Furthermore, Japan’s industrial relations literature suffers from two enduring English / 
Japanese translation difficulties. First, the phrase, “industrial relations” is understood in the English 
language to comprise three actors that constitute a system: employers, employees, and the 
government. In Japanese, industrial relations is translated as 労使関係 (roshi kankei). The first 
Chinese character represents ‘labor’. The second character stands for use of capital. The last two 
characters are ‘relations’. The function of government, more specifically the role of law, is 
conspicuously absent from the term. All too often, it also appears to have been completely 
overlooked in the research literature. Second, the object of industrial relations studies, the “web of 
rules governing employment relations,” simply does not translate well from English to Japanese. In 
contrast, the legal ecology of the Japanese enterprise offers parameters of analysis that are properly 
comparative and well-suited to social science research. 
 As Kristensen observed, “capitalism may be seen as a truly formidable social innovation.” 
(2005, p. 392). Yet, this innovation, “was institutionalized in highly different ways in different 
countries, each with its particular composition of former status groups and relations and balances…” 
(p. 393). The Japan case demonstrates extremely successful efforts at adaptive appropriation of 
foreign norms that facilitated national reconstruction and the elaboration of Japanese cultural 
propensities into a new realm: that of the modern workplace.14 As the ‘civilizing process’ continues, 
                                                     
14 For details of the postwar adaptive appropriate process in Japan, see (Kettler, D. et al. 1997).  
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perhaps the role and function of employee job security and participation will become notable 
benchmarks in the ecological analysis of the modern enterprise. 
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Figure 1: The Legal Ecology of the U.S. Enterprise 
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Figure 2: The Legal Ecology of the German Enterprise  
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Figure 3: The Legal Ecology of the Japanese Enterprise 
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 Figure 4: The Legal Ecology of the Danish Enterprise  
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Figure 5: The Legal Ecology of the Chinese Enterprise (a provisional assessment) 
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Appendix 1: Organizing International Business Course Plan 
 
Business, Language, and Culture Year Three: 
Organizing International Business 
 
Course content: 
The course provides initial and essential background to international business: what it is, where the 
notion came from, and how the factors related to international business are changing modern 
business organization in light of globalization.  
Through lecture, readings, class discussion, case work and other educational means, students will 
acquire knowledge of theories about international business and how these have evolved over time. 
Against this background we will explore the organization, structure, and communication 
implications that inhere within modern multinational corporations (MNCs). The next steps will be 
to examine internationalization strategies and issues of cross-border management, particularly 
concerning the management of innovation. Through the use of team case studies, students will be 
invited to actively apply and further refine the knowledge they have gained in the formulation of 
practical decisions aimed at achieving international business success.  
 
Learning objectives:  
At the end of the course students should be able to 
a. describe the main historical themes of international management theory. 
b. account for recent theoretical developments in the field, especially concerning the construct 
of “innovation” and its business management across international borders. 
c. compare and contrast the theories in question and apply them on specific cases, drawing on 
lectures and discussions with managers active in the process of organizing international 
business. 
 
Teaching methods 
Class lectures and discussions will be related to a compendium and required text. Case study will, 
as stated above, offer opportunities for students to reflection upon and refine what they have learned 
through study - and this in team groups.  
Examination  
The oral-synopsis examination format will be used. The synopsis should be between 1 and 2 pages 
on a topic of the student’s choosing. It must be properly submitted to be admitted to the 
examination, which is individual and lasts 20 minutes. The synopsis itself is not evaluated as part of 
the oral examination grade.  
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Instructors:  
Instuctor 1 (also Course Coordinator)  
Instructor 2  
Instructor 3  
Instructor 4  
Instructor 5  
 
Required text: Morgan, G., Whitley, R., & Moen, E. (2006). Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Required Course Compendium: available in the bookstore.  
 
Case exercises and case feedback: There are three Case exercises offered in the course. The first 
Case has preparatory material and is conducted completely in class; there is nothing to hand in to 
the instructor. Groups are randomly assigned for the Case. Subsequent case groupings are at will; 
groups should not exceed five students (accordingly to general principles for effective 
participation). The second and third Cases should be prepared in groups before the Case is held. For 
these two Cases, groups should submit a Microsoft Word (or other appropriate) file to the course 
Sitescape folder by midnight of the Case day of the course. The case analysis should not exceed 
three double-spaced pages. This will aid the instructor in Case analysis. Furthermore, each student 
group will have one opportunity for written feedback on their Case analysis. Please designate on the 
cover of the submission which Case submitted should receive such attention. NOTE: The 
procedures outlined in this paragraph are subject to change, based upon class size. 
 
LESSON PLAN 
 
Class 1: Course Overview and Comparative Legal Ecologies of the Firm/ Instructor 1  
 W36, 4 September 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room:  TBA. 
 
Morgan, G. (2005). Introduction: Changing Capitalisms? Internationalization, Institutional Change, 
and Systems of Economic Organization. Chapter 1 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), 
Changing Capitalisms? Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic 
Organization (Pp. 1-18). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Tackney, Charles T. (2000). Changing Approaches to Employment Relations in Japan. Chapter 4 in 
G.J. Bamber, F. Park, C. Lee, P.K. Ross, and K. Broadbent (Eds.), Employment Relations in the 
Asia-Pacific (Pp. 64 – 79). London: Business Press.  
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Part I: The Internationalization Process 
 
Class 2: The evolution of international business and internationalisation theories / Instructor 2 
W37, 11 September 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA. 
 
>Groups to be formalized for next week’s Case exercise. The Case background and materials will 
be introduced and explained.  
 
Deeg, R. (2005). Path Dependency, Institutional Complementarity, and Change in National 
Business Systems. Chapter 2 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing 
Capitalisms? Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp. 
21-52). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Griffin, R. and Pustay, M. (2005). Chapter 6, International Trade and Investment Theory. 
International Business - A Managerial Perspective. 4th edition. Prentice Hall, pp. 144- 175. 
 
Dunning ,J. H. (2001). The Key Literature on IB Activities 1960-2000. In A.N. Rugman and T.L. 
Brewer (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Business, pp. 36-68, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Class 3: First Case: U.N. crisis intervention team practicum / Instructors 1 and 5 
W38, 18 September 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA. 
 
< Case materials are to be found on-line in the Course folder.> 
 
Class 4: The internationalisation process and internationalisation modes: Export, Import, FDI, 
Joint-Ventures, Alliances, Mergers and Acquisitions / Instructor 2 
W39, 25 September 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA. 
Hancké, B, and M. Goyer (2005). Degrees of Freedom: Rethinking the Institutional Analysis of 
Economic Change. Chapter 3 in  G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing 
Capitalisms? Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp. 
53 – 77). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Griffin, R. and Pustay, M. (2005). International Business - A Managerial Perspective. 4th edition. 
Prentice Hall. Chapter 12 & 13. 
Björkman, I. & M. Forsgren (2000). Nordic International Business Research: A Review of its 
Development, International Studies of Management and Organization, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 6-25 
 
Class 5: Second Case: Cochran S.A. / Instructor 1 
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W40, 2 October 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA. 
Assignment: Read and solve the “Cochrane S.A.” case at home. Hand in a maximum three pages 
summary of your solution in advance of the class. 
 
Class 6: Internationalisation: How, why and where / Instructor 4 
W41, 9 October 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA.. 
Whitley, R. (2005). How National are Business Systems? The Role of States and Complementary 
Institutions in Standardizing Systems of Economic Coordination and Control at the National Level. 
Chapter 8 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp. 191 - 231). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Welch, L.S. & R.K. Luostarinen (1988). Internationalisation: Evolution of a Concept, Journal of 
General Management, 14(2): 34-55. 
Whitelock, J (2002). Theories of Internationalisation and their Impact on Market Entry, 
International Marketing Review, 19(4): 342-347. 
 
WEEK 42 No Classes 
 
Part II: The Structure of International Business 
 
Class 7:  Guest Lecture 1: International Business Strategy and Cross-border Management / 
Program graduate 
W43, 23 October 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA.. 
< Guest manager material to be available on-line in the Course folder.> 
 
Class 8: International strategy and cross-border management / Instructor 3 
W44, 30 October 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA. 
 
Morgan, G., and S. Quack (2005). Internationalization and Capability Development in Professional 
Services Firms. Chapter 10 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp.  276 – 311). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bartlett, C. and Ghoshal, S. (1998), Managing Across Borders; The Transnational Solution. 
London: Random House, Chapters 1 (pp. 3-20) and 4 (pp. 65-81). 
Rugman A. and Verbeke, A. (2003),’Strategies for Multinational Enterprises’, Chapter 24 in David 
Faulkner and Andrew Campbell, The Oxford Handbook of Strategy. Volume II: Corporate 
Strategy, pp. 183-205. 
WEEK 45 No Classes 
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Class 10: Organising and structuring the MNC / Instructor 1 
W46, 13 November 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA. 
 
Whitley, R. (2005). Developing Transnational Organizational Capabilities in Multinational 
Companies: Institutional Constraints on Authority Sharing and Careers in Six Types of MNC. 
Chapter 9 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp. 235 - 276). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hitt, M; Ireland, R. and Hoskisson, R. (2005) Ch. 11 in Strategic Management: Competitiveness 
and Globalization, Concepts and Cases.  Thomson – South Western, Mason, Ohio. 
 
Westney, E. (2003) Geography as a Design Variable. In Birkinshaw et al., The Future of the 
Multinational Company. Chicester: Wiley. 
 
Class 9: International management of innovation / Instructor 3  
W47, 19 November 2007, Monday, 14:25 – 16:05, TBA. 
Moen, E. and K. Lilja (2005). Change in Coordinated Market Economies: The Case of Nokia and 
Finland. Chapter 12 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp. 352 - 379). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 
Barlett, C., Ghoshal, S. Birkinshaw, J. (2003), ‘Creating and Leveraging Knowledge: The 
Worldwide Learning Challenge’, Chapter 5 in Christopher A. Barlett, Sumantra Ghoshal, and Julian 
Birkinshaw, Transnational Management: Text, Cases, and Readings in Cross-Border Management, 
4th ed., Boston: McGraw-Hill, pp. 456-465. 
 
Doz, Y, Santos, J. and Williamson, P. (2001), From Global to Metanational: How Companies Win 
in the Knowledge Economy, Chapters 1&2, pp. 1-52.  
 
Class 11: Aesthetics in the Global Marketplace / Instructor 4 
W47, 22 November 2007, Thursday 10:45 – 12:25, Room: TBA. 
 
Kristensen, P.H. (2005). Modelling National Business Systems and the Civilizing Process. Chapter 
13 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing Capitalisms? Internationalization, 
Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp. 383 - 414). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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Jenkins, R. (1992). Culture, Status and Distinction. Chapter 6 in Pierre Bourdieu (pp. 128-151). 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Temporal, P. (2000).International Brand Acceptance in Asia. Chapter 9 in Branding in Asia. The 
Creation, Development, and Management of Asian Brands for the Global Market (pp. 225-243). 
New York: Wiley.  
 
Temporal, P. (2000).International Brand Acceptance in Asia. Considerations for Asian Companies 
to Compete in the International and Global Markets. Chapter 10 in Branding in Asia. The Creation, 
Development, and Management of Asian Brands for the Global Market (pp. 245-249). New York: 
Wiley.  
 
Considerations for Asian Companies to Compete in the International and Global Markets. Chapter 
10 in 245-249 
 
Boys Will Be Girls: Male Cosmetics and Beauty Mags Change Face of Youth (June 22, 1998). 
http://web-japan.org/trends98/honbun/ntj980619.html  <This text will be available either through 
the Internet or copied to Sitescape.>.  
 
Class 12: Third Case: PG in Japan / Instructor 1 
W48, 27 November 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA. 
Assignment: Read and solve the case “PG in Japan: The SK-II Globalization Project. Bartlett, 
Ghoshal, and Birkinshaw, pp. 466-484” at home. Hand in a maximum three pages summary of your 
solution in advance of the class. 
 
Class 13: Organizing International Business Course Summation / Instructor 1 
W49, 4 December 2007, Tuesday, 13:30 – 15:10, Room: TBA. 
Herrigel, G. and V. Wittke (2005). Varieties of Vertical Disintegration: The Global Trend Toward 
Heterogeneous Supply Relations and the Reproduction of Difference in US and German 
Manufacturing. Chapter 11 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp. 312 - 351). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Morgan, G. (2005). Institutional Complementarities, Path Dependency, and the Dynamics of Firms. 
Chapter 14 in G. Morgan, R. Whitley, and E. Moen (Eds.), Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic Organization (pp. 415 - 446). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
